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Abstract
When the performance of a team of agents exceeds our expectations or
fall short of them, we often explain this by saying that there was some
synergy in the team—either positive (the team exceeded our expecta-
tions) or negative (they fell short). Our aim in this article is to develop
a formal and principled way of measuring synergies, both positive and
negative. Using characteristic function cooperative games as our under-
lying model, we present a formal measure of synergy, based on the idea
that a synergy is exhibited when the performance of a team deviates from
the norm. We then show that our synergy value is the only possible such
measure that satisfies certain intuitive properties. We then investigate
some alternative characterisations of this measure.
1 Introduction
According to the Oxford English dictionary, synergy is “the interaction or coop-
eration of two or more organizations, substances, or other agents to produce a
combined effect greater than the sum of their separate effects”. Here, we inter-
pret the word “greater” to mean either greater in harm, or in benefit. In other
words, a synergy can be either negative, positive, or zero. We address the fol-
lowing fundamental question: what is an appropriate measure of synergy? For
example, suppose we have a set of school children, who are given various group
assignments in different subjects throughout the year. At the end of the year,
every possible group (or “coalition” as we call it) has worked on some activity,
for which they have received a grade. Now, suppose the teacher is asked to
characterise the synergies of various different groups—the extent to which the
groups work particularly well or particularly badly. What is a reasoned way to
do this? It is this question that we address in the present paper.
To illustrate some of the subtleties involved in this issue, suppose the student
groups C = {1, 2, 3} and C ′ = {4, 5, 6} each receive a grade of, say, 70 each.
Naively it might appear that they exhibit equal synergies. But suppose:
• Each of the three student in C is shy. This may inhibit him/her from
making any substantive contribution in a group activity. However, sup-
pose those three students are good friends. As such, when they were all
together in a coalition with no one else, they could overcome their shyness.
Consequently, they achieved a score of 70—a score that indicates an im-
provement in the overall performance (considering the small contribution
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that each of them usually makes). Based on this, the teacher may con-
clude that there is a positive synergy among those students; putting them
together in a group helps bring the best out of them.
• Each student in C ′ has good leadership skills. As such, they each usually
perform very well in group activities. However, when they are in the same
coalition with no one else, they argue constantly. As a result, they un-
derperform. For those students, the teacher may consider a score of 70 to
be relatively low; the teacher expects more of them. This suggests that
those students must not be placed together in a group with no one else,
otherwise there will be a negative synergy among them.
So, although C and C ′ have the same grade, the synergy seems to be positive
in the first coalition, and negative in the second. This suggests that the grade
alone might not reveal the true nature of the synergy among the members of a
coalition.
An alternative way to quantify synergy is to think of it as a surplus—the
extra score obtained through the formation of the group. This surplus can be
quantified, for example, by comparing the score of the group with the scores
obtained when each member works alone.1 Here, the intuition is that the per-
formance of any given member is expected to be equal to his or her performance
when working alone; any deviation from this expectation is then attributed to
the synergy among the group members. Based on this, the suitability of such a
measure depends on the answer to the following fundamental question:
If the performance of an individual working alone is different than his or
her performance when working in a certain group, should this difference be
entirely attributed to that group, or is the individual also (at least partially)
responsible?
Note that with the aforementioned interpretation of synergy, the entire difference
is indeed attributed to the group. We argue that this may not necessarily be
the most appropriate answer in all cases. In our school scenario, for example,
there could be a student who is intelligent but socially anxious. This student
excels when working alone, but underperforms in group activities, regardless of
the identities of his or her team mates. This suggests that any such deterioration
in the student’s performance is not necessarily the group’s fault.
The above discussion suggests the need for a more sophisticated measure
that inherently avoids the aforementioned limitations. We propose a measure of
synergy that, instead of considering it to be a surplus, considers to be a deviation
from the norm. In other words, instead of being something extra, we consider
it to be something special or abnormal. A measure of synergy then reflects the
degree to which a certain coalition differs from the norm. One can then define
the norm such that the resulting measure exhibits certain desirable properties.
Such properties could be aimed, for example, at capturing the way in which each
individual normally behaves in different groups, e.g., to identify any students
who are social or antisocial by nature. With this in mind, we propose one such
1Other ways to quantify the surplus are discussed in Section ??.
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measure, and show that it is the only possible measure that satisfies certain
intuitive properties.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we will use standard notions from cooperative game
theory. In particular, a characteristic-function game is a pair, (N, v), where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, and v : 2N → R is the characteristic
function, which assigns to each subset (or “coalition”) C ⊆ N a real value,
v(C)—called the value of C—which can be interpreted as the utility attainable
by that coalition. For instance, in a game that represents our school scenario,
every player represents a student, while the characteristic function returns the
grade attained by a group. As common in the literature, we will assume that
v(∅) = 0. We will denote the set of all such games by G , and will denote the
universe of players by N .
The following standard definitions will be used heavily throughout the paper:
Definition 1 (Symmetric Players) Let (N, v) be a game, and let i, j ∈ N .
Players i and j are said to be symmetric if and only if: v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ {j})
for every C ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
From a strategic perspective, any two symmetric players are identical in the
game; they only differ in their names.
Definition 2 (Null Player) Let (N, v) be a game. A player i ∈ N is called a
null player if and only if v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C) for all C ⊆ N .2
In words, whenever a null player joins a coalition, it makes no impact on that
coalition’s value.
Definition 3 (Dummy Player) Let (N, v) be a game. A player i ∈ N is called
a dummy player if and only if v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C) + v({i}) for all C ⊆ N \ {i}.
Intuitively, a dummy player is one whose performance is never affected by
his or her team mates; the player always produces exactly the same amount of
utility. We will say a game (N, v) is a game of dummies if every player in it is a
dummy player.
Definition 4 (Sum of Two Games) The sum of two games, (N, v) and (N,w),
is a game denoted by (N, v + w), where (v + w)(C) = v(C) + w(C) for every
coalition C ⊆ N .
Similarly, subtracting (N, v) from (N,w) results in a game denoted by (N, v−
w), where (v − w)(C) = v(C)− w(C) for every coalition C ⊆ N .
2If a coalition C contains player i then the equality holds trivially, because then C∪{i} = C.
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Definition 5 (Shapley Value) Let (N, v) be a game, and let i ∈ N . The
Shapley value [? ] of i is denoted by φi(N, v) and given by:
φi(N, v) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
|C|! (n− |C|−1)!
n!
(v(C ∪ {i}) − v(C)) (1)
Assuming that the grand coalition (i.e., N) will be formed, and that we want
to divide v(N) among the players, Shapley showed that (φ1(N, v), . . . , φn(N, v))
is the only possible division of v(N) that satisfies all of the following properties:
P1. (Symmetry): For every game (N, v) ∈ G and every pair of symmetric
players i and j in the game: φi(N, v) = φj(N, v);
P2. (Null Player): For every game (N, v) ∈ G , and every null player i in
the game: φi(N, v) = 0;
P3. (Efficiency): For every game (N, v) ∈ G , we have:
∑
i∈N φi(N, v) =
v(N);
P4. (Additivity): For every pair of games, (N, v) and (N,w), and every
player i ∈ N , we have: φi(N, v + w) = φi(N, v) + φi(N,w).
Properties P1—P4 are commonly known as the Shapley axioms.
3 A New Measure of Synergy
We start with a general definition of what a synergy measure actually is.
Definition 6 (Measure of Synergy) A measure of synergy ψ is a real valued
function on: ⋃
(N,v)∈G
{(N, v,C) : C ⊆ N},
where ψ((N, v,C)) represents the amount of synergy among the members in C
in the game (N, v). The set of all such measures will be denoted by Ψ.
For notational convenience, we will write ψNv (C) instead of ψ((N, v,C)).
Furthermore, since it is typically assumed that the empty set has no value (i.e.,
v(∅) = 0), it makes sense to also assume it has no synergy. As such, we will
assume that ψNv (∅) = 0 for all (N, v) ∈ G .
To try and identify a reasonable measure in Ψ, we considered the following
properties, which are inspired by the Shapley axioms:
P5. (Symmetric-Synergy): A measure ψ ∈ Ψ satisfies P5 if, for every
game (N, v) ∈ G , and every pair of symmetric players i and j in that game,
we have: ψNv (C ∪ {i}) = ψ
N
v (C ∪ {j}) for all C ⊆ N \ {i, j};
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P6. (Null-Synergy): A measure ψ ∈ Ψ satisfies P6 if ψ
N
v (C) = ψ
N
v (C ∪
{i}) for every game (N, v) and every null player i in that game;
P7. (Dummy-Synergy): A measure ψ ∈ Ψ satisfies P7 if, for every game
(N, v) ∈ G , the following is a game of dummies: (N, v − ψNv );
P8. (Normalized-Synergy): A measure ψ ∈ Ψ satisfies P8 if, for every
game (N, v) ∈ G , we have:
∑
C⊆N ψ
N
v (C) = 0;
P9. (Additive-Synergy): A measure ψ ∈ Ψ satisfies P9 if, for every
pair of games, (N, v) and (N,w), and every coalition C ⊆ N , we have:
ψNv (C) + ψ
N
w (C) = ψ
N
v+w(C).
Observe that, while P5, P6, and P8 are fairly natural counterparts of Shapley ax-
ioms, properties P7 and P8 are new. Let us discuss and motivate these properties
in more detail.
Property P5 states that replacing a player with another symmetric one does
not alter the synergy. This seems natural, because any two symmetric players
are essentially identical except for having different names. Thus, it seems strange
to claim that they differ in the way they affect the synergies.
Property P6 states that a null player does not affect the synergy in a coalition.
The intuition behind this may become clearer through the following example:
Example 3.1 Let (N,u) be a game where N = {1, 2, 3} and u is defined as
follows:
u(∅) = 0 u({3}) = 0
u({1}) = 10 u({1, 3}) = 10
u({2}) = 20 u({2, 3}) = 20
u({1, 2}) = 1000000 u({1, 2, 3}) = 1000000
Observe that, in this example, player 3 is a null player. Also see how the
utility attainable by 1 and 2 increases significantly when they form a coalition
(compared to the case where they each form a singleton coalition). Looking at
this game, it seems reasonable to claim that whatever positive synergy there
is between 1 and 2—which made them achieve the million units of utility—is
retained when player 3 joins their coalition. In other words, the null player does
not affect the synergy when joining the coalition, just as stated by Property P6.
Property P7 essentially states that without synergies, we are left with a game
in which every player is a dummy, i.e., we are left with an “additive” game—one
in which the value of every coalition C ⊆ N is simply the sum of the values that
the members achieve when each of them i ∈ C forms its own coalition {i}. To
make the underlying concept clearer, let us put it in the context of our school
scenario. In an “additive” classroom, whenever a group is formed, each member
completely ignores his or her team mates, and acts exactly just like he or she
would act when working alone. It seems reasonable to claim that this is how a
classroom would look like if we strip away all synergies from it, so to speak.
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Property P8 relates to our interpretation of synergy as a deviation from the
norm. This interpretation implies that a coalition whose value is greater than
the norm has positive synergy, while a coalition whose value is lower than the
norm has negative synergy. More importantly, a coalition whose value follows the
norm has exactly zero synergy. Perhaps the most intuitive interpretation of the
“norm” is to consider it to be the “average” case. As such, it seems reasonable
that the coalitions on average follow the norm. That is to say, it seems reasonable
that synergy on average equals zero, just as stated in Property P8.
Finally, let us comment on P9. While this property is admittedly not very
intuitive, at least it has an intuitive implication: Scaling a game—by multiplying
all coalition values by some constant—does not change the relative differences
between the synergies in that game.
Taking the above properties into consideration, we propose the following
measure of synergy, called the synergy value:
Definition 7 (Synergy Value) The synergy value is the measure of synergy,
χ ∈ Ψ, defined for every game (N, v) ∈ G and every coalition C ⊆ N as follows:
χNv (C) = v(C)−
∑
i∈C
φi(N, v), (2)
where φi(N, v) is the average Shapley value of player i taken over all sub-games
(C, v) : C ⊆ N . That is,
φi(N, v) = 2
1−n
∑
C⊆N :i∈C
φi(C, v). (3)
We conclude this section with the following theorem, which essentially states
that if we view properties P5 to P9 as axioms, then those axioms characterize
the Synergy value χ.
Theorem 3.2 The synergy value χ is the only measure in Ψ that satisfies prop-
erties P5 to P9.
Proof 3.3 We begin by showing that the synergy value satisfies the five properties
listed in the statement of the theorem.
Claim 3.4 The Synergy value χ satisfies properties P5 to P9.
Proof 3.5 Let (N, v) be a game. To prove that χ satisfies P5, for every pair of
symmetric players i and j in the game, and every coalition C ⊆ N \ {i, j}, we
need to prove that: χNv (C ∪ {i}) = χ
N
v (C ∪ {j}), i.e.,
v(C ∪ {i}) −
∑
k∈C∪{i}
φk(N, v) = v(C ∪ {j}) −
∑
k∈C∪{j}
φk(N, v). (4)
Since i and j are symmetric, then: v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ {j}),∀C ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Consequently, to prove that Equation (4) holds, it suffices to show that:
φi(N, v) = φj(N, v). (5)
To this end, observe that:
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• For every C ⊆ N : i, j ∈ C, the players i and j are symmetric in the game
(C, v), and so φi(C, v) = φj(C, v).
• For every C ⊆ N \ {i, j}, we know from (1) that:
φi(C ∪ {i}, v) =
∑
S⊆C
|S|! ((|C|+1) − |S|−1)!
(|C|+1)!
(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)), (6)
φi(C ∪ {j}, v) =
∑
S⊆C
|S|! ((|C|+1) − |S|−1)!
(|C|+1)!
(v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S)). (7)
Now since i and j are symmetric, and since every S ⊆ C does not contain
i nor j, then by definition of symmetry: v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}). Thus,
equations (6) and (7) imply that φi(C ∪ {i}, v) = φj(C ∪ {j}, v).
The above two cases imply that Equation (5) always holds, meaning that χ sat-
isfies P5.
Moving on to P6, we need to prove that χ
N
v (C ∪ {i}) = χ
N
v (C) for every null
player i in game (N, v). Since i is a null player in (N, v), then it is also a null
player in every sub-game (C, v) : C ⊆ N , and so φi(N, v) = 0. We also know
from the definition of a null player that v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C) for every C ⊆ N . As
such,
χNv (C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ {i}) −
∑
j∈C∪{i}
φj(N, v) = v(C)−
∑
j∈C
φj(N, v) = χ
N
v (C).
Next, we prove that χ satisfies P7. Let ϑ = v−χ
N
v . That is, ϑ =
∑
i∈C φi(N, v).
We need to prove that every player i in game (N,ϑ) is a dummy. To this end,
it suffices to note that for every i ∈ N and C ⊆ N \ {i}:
ϑ(C ∪ {i}) =
∑
j∈C∪{i}
φj(N, v) = φi(N, v) +
∑
j∈C
φj(N, v) = ϑ({i}) + ϑ(C).
Moving on to P8, we need to show that the following holds:∑
C⊆N
χNv (C) = 0. (8)
This can be shown as follows:∑
C⊆N
χNv (C) =
∑
C⊆N
(
v(C)−
∑
i∈C
φi(N, v)
)
=
∑
C⊆N
v(C) − 21−n
∑
C⊆N
∑
i∈C
∑
S⊆N :i∈S
φi(S, v)
=
∑
C⊆N
v(C) −
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N :i∈S
φi(S, v)
=
∑
C⊆N
v(C) −
∑
S⊆N
∑
i∈S
φi(S, v)
=
∑
C⊆N
v(C) −
∑
S⊆N
v(S) = 0.
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Finally, we deal with P9. We need to prove that for every pair of games, (N, v)
and (N,w), and every C ⊆ N , we have: χNv (C) + χ
N
w (C) = χ
N
v+w(C). Since φ
satisfies P4, it follows that φj(N, v + w) = φj(N, v) + φj(N,w). Thus,
χNv+w(C ∪ {i}) = (v + w)(C ∪ {i}) −
∑
j∈C∪{i}
φj(N, v + w)
= v(C) −
∑
j∈C
φj(N, v) + w(C) +
∑
j∈C
φj(N,w)
= χNv (C) + χ
N
w (C).
This concludes the proof of Claim 3.4.
Having proved that χ satisfies properties P5 to P9, it remains to prove that χ
is in fact the only measure in Ψ that satisfies those properties. In other words,
assuming that x ∈ Ψ is a measure satisfying properties P5 to P9, we need to show
that x = χ. This will be done using of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6 Given a game (N, v), a coalition S ⊆ N , and a constant α ∈ R,
let us denote by (N, vS,α) the game where the value of a coalition C ⊆ N is:
vS,α(C) =
{
α if S ⊆ C,
0 otherwise.
(9)
If a measure of synergy ψ ∈ Ψ satisfies properties P5, P6, P7 and P8, then
ψNvS,α(C) =
{
(1− 21−|S|) α if S ⊆ C,
−|C ∩ S| (21−|S|) α|S| otherwise.
Proof 3.7 In the game (N, vS,α), Property P7 states that (N, vS,α − ψ
N
vS,α) is a
game of dummies. In other words, there exist real numbers (βi)i∈N such that:
∀C ⊆ N, vS,α(C)− ψ
N
vS,α(C) =
∑
i∈C
βi. (10)
Now, observe that every i ∈ N \ S is a null player, meaning that: vS,α({i}) = 0
and that ψNvS,α({i}) = 0 (based on Property P6). Thus, based on Equation (10),
we have:
βi = 0, ∀i ∈ N \ S. (11)
Furthermore, observe that every pair of players i, j ∈ S are symmetric, meaning
that vS,α({i}) = vS,α({j}) and that ψ
N
vS,α
({i}) = ψNvS,α({j}) (based on Prop-
erty P5). This, as well as Equation (10), imply that there exists a real number,
β ∈ R, such that:
βi = β,∀i ∈ S. (12)
Property P8, as well as equations (9) to (12), imply that:( |S|−1∑
s=1
∑
C⊆N :|C∩S|=s
(−sβ)
)
+
∑
C⊆N :S⊆C
(α− |S|β) = 0.
8
Thus, we have:
β =
α21−|S|
|S|2n−1
.
This, as well as equations (9) to (12) imply the correctness of Lemma 3.6.
Recall that we wanted to use Lemma 3.6 to prove that x = χ. To do this,
we need to first introduce the notion of a “carrier game” [? ]. In particular, for
every coalition S ⊆ N , we will denote by (N, vS) the carrier game over S—the
game in which the value of a coalition C ⊆ N is:
vS(C) =
{
1 if S ⊆ C,
0 otherwise.
Shapley [? ] proved that every game (N, v) is a linear combination of carrier
games. In other words, there exist real numbers (αS)S⊆N,S 6=∅ such that, for every
C ⊆ N , we have:
v(C) =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
vS,αS(C). (13)
Now since x and χ both satisfy properties P5, P6, and P7, then Lemma 3.6 implies
that:
xNvS,αS
= χNvS,αS
, ∀S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅. (14)
Based on equations (13) and (14), as well as the fact that both x and χ satisfy
Property P9, we have:
xNv =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
xNvS,αS
=
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
χNvS,αS
= χNv .
Since this is true for every game, (N, v) ∈ G , we conclude that x = χ. This
concludes the proof of Theorem 3.2. 
4 An Alternative Axiomatization
The characterization that we introduced in Section 3 for the Synergy value,
χ ∈ Ψ, relies on Property P9, which is admittedly not very intuitive. There-
fore, in this section we identify an alternative axiomatization of χ that replaces
Property P9 with a somewhat more intuitive property. First, let us introduce
the following definition from cooperative game theory:
Definition 8 (Marginal Contribution) Let (N, v) be a game in G . The marginal
contribution of a player i ∈ N to a coalition C ⊆ N is denoted by MCCi (N, v),
and is given by: MCCi (N, v) = v(C ∪ {i}) − v(C).
Observe that, MCCi = 0 for all i ∈ N and C ⊆ N : i ∈ C. Having defined
the marginal contribution, we are now ready to introduce a new property, called
P10.
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P10. (Marginal-Synergy): A measure ψ ∈ Ψ satisfies P10 if, for every
pair of games (N, v) and (N,w) with the same set of players, and for every
coalition C ⊆ N , if
∀i ∈ C,∀S ⊆ N \ {i}, MC Si (N, v) = MC
S
i (N,w), (15)
then the following holds:
ψNv (C) = ψ
N
w (C).
To put this in the context of our school scenario, imagine that by the end
of Year 1, the teacher has developed a certain opinion on the synergy among
a certain group of students, C ⊆ N (where N is the set of students in the
classroom). Furthermore, imagine that, in Year 2, the classroom consisted of the
same set of students—N . Finally, imagine that the performance of every member
of C remained unchanged (compared to Year 1). Then, it seems reasonable for
the teacher to keep her opinion regarding the synergy among the members of C,
even if the performance (of some or all) of the students outside C has changed
(compared to Year 1).
We conclude this section with Theorem 4.1, which essentially states that P6,
P7, P8, and P10 are axioms that characterize the Synergy value χ. Compared to
the previous axiomatization from Section 3, here we replace properties P9 and
P5 with Property P10.
Theorem 4.1 The Synergy value, χ ∈ Ψ, is the only measure in Ψ that satisfies
properties P6, P7, P8, and P10.
Proof 4.2 We begin the proof of Theorem 4.1 by ascertaining that the Synergy
value satisfies the four properties listed in the statement of the theorem. As for
P6, P7 and P8, we already know from Claim 3.4 that χ satisfies those properties.
Thus, we only need to prove that χ satisfies Property P10.
Claim 4.3 The Synergy value, χ ∈ Ψ, satisfies property P10.
Proof 4.4 Let (N, v) and (N,w) be two games with the same set of players, N ,
and let C ⊆ N be a coalition for which Equation (15) holds. Based on this, it is
easy to show that the following two equations hold:3
v(C) = w(C). (16)
∀i ∈ C, ∀T ⊆ N : i ∈ T, ∀S ⊆ T \ {i}, MC Si (T, v) = MC
S
i (T,w). (17)
Thus, based on the definition of the average Shapley value, φi, we find that:
∀i ∈ C, φi(N, v) = φi(N,w). (18)
Equations (16) and (18) as well as Definition 7—the definition of the Synergy
value—immediately imply the correctness of Claim 4.3.
3The difference between equations (15) and (17) is that the former deals with the games
(N, v) and (N,w), while the latter deals with all sub-games (T, v) and (T,w) such that T ⊆
N : i ∈ T .
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Having proved Claim 4.3, all that remains is to prove the uniqueness state-
ment in Theorem 4.1. For this, we need to first introduce two new definitions,
and to prove yet another claim.
Definition 9 (N+v ) For every game (N, v) ∈ G , the set N
+
v ⊆ N is the set of
players in (N, v) who are not null players. More formally,
N+v = {i ∈ N : ∃C ⊆ N,MC
C
i (N, v) 6= 0}. (19)
Definition 10 ((N, vi)) For every set of players, N ⊂ N , and every i ∈ N ,
and every characteristic function v : 2N → R, the game (N, vi) is defined as
follows:
vi(C) = v(C \ {i}), ∀C ⊆ N. (20)
Claim 4.5 For every game (N, v) ∈ G , and every i ∈ N+v , the following holds:
N+vi ⊂ N
+
v .
Proof 4.6 Let i be a player in N+v . Based on Definition 10, we have:
∀C ⊆ N : i ∈ C, MCCi (N, vi) = vi(C ∪ {i})− vi(C) (based on Definition 8)
= vi(C)− vi(C) (because i ∈ C)
= 0. (21)
∀C ⊆ N : i /∈ C, MCCi (N, vi) = vi(C ∪ {i}) − vi(C) (based on Definition 8)
= v(C ∪ {i} \ {i}) − v(C \ {i}) (based on Definition 10)
= v(C)− v(C) (because i /∈ C)
= 0. (22)
Equations (21) and (22) imply that i is a null player in the game (N, vi). Thus,
based on Definition 9:
i /∈ N+vi . (23)
On the other hand, the following always holds for every game (N, v) and any two
distinct player, y, z ∈ N : y 6= z:
∀C ⊆ N, MCCz (N, vy) = vy(C ∪ {z})− vy(C)
= v((C ∪ {z}) \ {y}) − v(C \ {y})
= v((C \ {y}) ∪ {z}) − v(C \ {y})
= MCC\{y}z (N, v). (24)
For every j ∈ N \ N+v , we know that j 6= i (because i ∈ N
+
v ). Then, based on
Equation (24), we have:
∀j ∈ N \N+v , MC
C
j (N, vi) = MC
C\{i}
j (N, v). (25)
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Furthermore, for every j ∈ N \N+v , we know from Definition 9 that j is a null
player in (N, v). This, as well as Equation (25), imply that
MCCj (N, vi) = 0, ∀j ∈ N \N
+
v .
This means that j is also a null player in (N, vi), not just in (N, v). Therefore,
based on Definition 9, we have:
j /∈ N+vi , ∀j ∈ N \N
+
v . (26)
Equations (23) and (26) imply the correctness of Claim 4.5.
Now we are ready to prove the uniqueness statement in Theorem 4.1. We
will do this by showing that, if x ∈ Ψ is a measure satisfying properties P6, P7,
P8, and P10, then x = χ. The proof will be an inductive one over |N
+
v |; we will
prove that
x = χ,∀(N, v) ∈ G : |N+v |= 0, (27)
and that
x = χ, ∀(N, v) ∈ G : |N+v |< s ⇒ x = χ, ∀(N, v) ∈ G : |N
+
v |= s. (28)
Step 1: Proving that (27) holds:
Definition 9 implies that, for every set of players N ⊂ N , there exists ex-
actly one game (N, v) ∈ G such that |N+v |= 0; this is the game in which ev-
ery coalition’s value equals zero. In other words, it is the game (N, v0) where
v0(C) = 0,∀C ⊆ N ; this is the only possible game in which every i ∈ N is a
null player. Since both x and χ satisfy Property P6, and since the empty set is
assumed to always have zero synergy, we conclude that:
∀C ⊆ N, xNv0(C) = χ
N
v0(C) = 0.
Therefore, Equation (27) holds, which is what we wanted to prove in Step 1.
Step 2: Proving that (28) holds:
To this end, assume that x = χ,∀(N, v) ∈ G : |N+v |< s for some s ∈ N, and
let (N,w) be a game in G such that |N+w |= s. Since s > 0, there exists at least
one player in N+w . Let b be an arbitrary player in N
+
w . To prove that (28) holds,
it suffices to show that the following equation holds:
xNw (C) = χ
N
w (C),∀C ⊆ N. (29)
To this end, Claim 4.5 implies that:∣∣N+wb∣∣ < ∣∣N+w ∣∣ .
Our inductive hypothesis then implies that:
xNwb(C) = χ
N
wb
(C), ∀C ⊆ N. (30)
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Importantly, for every i ∈ N \ {b}, we know from Equation (24) that:
∀C ⊆ N, MCCi (N,wb) = MC
C\{b}
i (N,w).
Therefore,
∀C ⊆ N \ {b}, MCCi (N,wb) = MC
C
i (N,w).
Based on this, as well as the fact that both x and χ satisfy Property P10, we find
that:
∀C ⊆ N \ {b}, xNwb(C) = x
N
w (C), (31)
∀C ⊆ N \ {b}, χNwb(C) = χ
N
w (C). (32)
Equations (30), (31) and (32) imply that the following holds
xNw (C) = χ
N
w (C),∀C ⊆ N \ {b}, (33)
Now since χ satisfies Property P7, then (N,w − χ
N
w ) is a game of dummies,
meaning that there exist real numbers (yi)i∈N such that:
∀C ⊆ N, w(C)− χNw (C) =
∑
i∈C
yi. (34)
Likewise, x satisfies Property P7, and so there exist real numbers (zi)i∈N such
that:
∀C ⊆ N, w(C)− xNw (C) =
∑
i∈C
zi. (35)
Now since both x and χ satisfy Property P8, then:∑
C⊆N
xNv (C) =
∑
C⊆N
ψNv (C)
This, as well as equations (34) and (35), imply that:∑
i∈N
yi =
∑
i∈N
zi. (36)
We also know that:
∀i ∈ N \ {b}, yi = w({i}) − χ
N
w ({i}) (following Equation (34))
= w({i}) − xNw ({i}) (following Equation (33))
= zi. (based on Equation (35)) (37)
Equations (36) and (37) imply that:
yi = zi, ∀i ∈ N. (38)
Equations (34), (35) and (38) imply the correctness of Equation (29), which in
turn implies the correctness of (28) as discussed earlier. This concludes step
Step 2 and, consequently, concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1. 
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5 A Different Interpretation
As mentioned in the introduction, we interpret synergy as a deviation from the
norm. Earlier in Section 3, to reflect this interpretation, we added Property P8 to
the axiomatization of the synergy measure.4 By following that route, we arrived
at the Synergy value, χ ∈ Ψ. In this section, we will arrive at the same measure,
but by following an alternative route. Specifically, this route starts by considering
the “norm” to be the case where every member makes the same impact that he
or she usually makes in a group. To better understand the intuition behind
this, let us revisit our school scenario. By observing the performance of different
groups, the teacher realizes that each one of the shy students usually (i.e., on
average) hardly makes any impact on his or her group. This observation alone
suggests that putting those students together in a coalition would lead to a low
score, unless there was some positive synergy that somehow improves the group
performance. This could explain why, when that coalition obtained a score of 70,
the synergy was deemed positive—that score was greater than what was expected
(judging from the average impact of each member). By a similar reasoning, the
synergy in the coalition of leaders was deemed negative—the teacher expected a
higher score from those students (again judging from the average impact of each
of them).
To try and develop a measure that captures the deviation from such a “norm”,
we must first develop a measure that quantifies the “average impact” of each
player, i.e., the average amount of utility that the player contributes towards the
value of a coalition. To put it differently, we must first answer the following
fundamental question:
Judging from the values of the different coalitions in a game, how can we
adequately quantify the average impact that a particular player makes?
This is particularly relevant when all what we know for a fact are the values
themselves, and not the exact factors that may have influenced those values.
Again consider our school scenario, where the impact that a student has on a
group may depend on various factors, such as the student’s reputation at school,
the past experiences that he or she may have shared with other members, etc.
Some of those factors are very hard (if not impossible) to observe or quantify.
On the other hand, the group scores are observable and comparable. In such
cases, one might desire the ability to measure the average impact of a player,
depending solely on the values of different coalitions.
To this end, a measure of average impact, θ, is a function that assigns to
every player i ∈ N a real value representing the average impact that i makes on
the value of a coalition containing i. As such, if we denote the set of all such
measures by Θ, then every θ ∈ Θ is a real valued function on:⋃
(N,v)∈G
{(N, v, i) : i ∈ N}.
For notational convenience, we will write θNv (i) instead of θ((N, v, i)).
4See our comment on Property P8 in Section 3 for more details.
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It is important to note that θNv (i) only considers the coalitions that contain
i. As for any of the remaining coalitions, i clearly has zero impact.5 This makes
θNv (i)/2 the average impact of i on all coalitions in the game.
The following are seemingly reasonable properties to have in a measure of
average impact θ ∈ Θ:
P11. (Symmetric-Impact): A measure θ ∈ Θ satisfies P11 if, for every
game (N, v) ∈ G , and every pair of symmetric players i and j in that game,
we have: θNv (i) = θ
N
v (j);
P12. (Average-Value): A measure θ ∈ Θ satisfies P12 if, for every game
(N, v) ∈ G , we have: 12
∑
i∈N θ
N
v (i) = 2
−n
∑
C⊆N v(C);
P13. (Marginal-Impact): A measure θ ∈ Θ satisfies P13 if, for every pair
of games (N, v) and (N,w) with the same set of players, and for every
player i ∈ N , if
∀C ⊆ N \ {i}, MCCi (N, v) =MC
C
i (N,w), (39)
then the following holds:
θNv (i) = θ
N
w (i).
The intuition behind property P11 is rather clear. As for P12, it also seems
intuitive as it states that the average outcome of a game is obtained when every
player in that game makes its average impact. Finally, to comment on P13, this
property implies that if the performance of a certain player remained unchanged,
then the average impact of this player should also remain unchanged, regardless
of whether the performance of some other player(s) in the game has changed.
Inspired by the above properties, we propose a measure of average impact,
called the Average-Impact value, and defined as follows:
Definition 11 (Average-Impact (AI) Value) The Average-Impact (AI) Value
is the measure of average impact, λ ∈ Θ, defined for every game (N, v) ∈ G and
every player i ∈ N as follows:
λNv (i) = φi(N, v). (40)
The following theorem implies that properties P11, P12 and P13 axiomatize λ.
Theorem 5.1 The AI value is the only measure in Θ that satisfies properties
P11, P12, and P13.
Proof 5.2 We begin by proving that the AI value satisfies the three properties
listed in the statement of the theorem.
Claim 5.3 The AI value satisfies properties P11, P12 and P13.
5This is because we restrict our attention to characteristic function games. However, this
assumption might not hold in partition function games [? ], where the value of a coalition may
be influenced by the actions of non-members.
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Proof 5.4 Let (N, v) be a game in G . We already showed that Equation (5)
holds for every pair of symmetric players i, j ∈ N , meaning that λ satisfies
Property P11. Moving on to P12, we have:
1
2
∑
i∈N
φi(N, v) = 2
−n
∑
i∈N
∑
C⊆N :i∈C
φi(C, v) (following Equation (3))
= 2−n
∑
C⊆N
∑
i∈C
φi(C, v)
= 2−n
∑
C⊆N
v(C) (as φ satisfies P3)
Consequently, λ satisfies P12. Finally, to prove that λ satisfies P13, it suffices
to note that, for every i ∈ N , φi(N, v) is by definition a weighted average of the
marginal contributions of i to all the coalitions in the game (N, v) (see equations
(1) and (3)).
Having proved the correctness of Claim 5.3, it remains to prove the unique-
ness statement in Theorem 5.1. For this, we need to introduce two additional
definitions:
Definition 12 (C(N, v)) For every game (N, v) ∈ G , the set C(N, v) ⊆ 2N is
the set of coalitions in (N, v) that each have at least one subset whose value is
non-zero. Formally,
C(N, v) = {C ⊆ N : ∃C ′ ⊆ C, v(C ′) 6= 0}. (41)
Definition 13 ((N, vS)) For every set of players N ⊂ N , and every coalition,
S ⊆ N , and every characteristic function v : 2N → R, the game (N, vS) is
defined as follows:
vS(C) = v(C)− v(C ∩ S), ∀C ⊆ N. (42)
Now, we are ready to prove the uniqueness statement in Theorem 5.1. More
specifically, assuming that δ ∈ Θ is an average-impact measure satisfying P11,
P12 and P13, we will prove that δ = λ. The proof will be an inductive one over
|C(N, v)|. More specifically, we will prove that
δ = λ, ∀(N, v) ∈ G : |C(N, v)|= 0, (43)
and that
δ = λ, ∀(N, v) ∈ G : |C(N, v)|< s ⇒ δ = λ, ∀(N, v) ∈ G : |C(N, v)|= s.
(44)
Step 1: Proving that (43) holds:
Definition 12 implies that, for every set of players N ⊂ N , there exists ex-
actly one game (N, v) ∈ G for which |C(N, v)|= 0; this is the game in which every
coalition’s value is zero, i.e., it is the game (N, v0), where v0(C) = 0,∀C ⊆ N .
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In this game, every pair of players are symmetric. Consequently, the following
holds, as both δ and λ satisfy Property P11:
δNv0(i) = δ
N
v0(j), ∀i, j ∈ N, (45)
λNv0(i) = λ
N
v0(j), ∀i, j ∈ N. (46)
Furthermore, since both δ and λ satisfy Property P12, then:∑
i∈N
δNv0(i) =
∑
i∈N
λNv0(i). (47)
Equations (45), (46) and (47) imply that δNv0 = λ
N
v0 , meaning that Equation (43)
holds, which is what we wanted to prove in Step 1.
Step 2: Proving that (44) holds:
Assuming that the following holds:
∀(N, v) ∈ G : |C(N, v)|< s, ∀i ∈ N, δNv (i) = λ
N
v (i), (48)
we need to prove that the following holds for every i ∈ N , where w is a charac-
teristic function such that |C(N,w)|= s:
δNw (i) = λ
N
w (i). (49)
Importantly, for every game (N, v) ∈ G , and every S ∈ C(N, v), we know that
C(N, vS) ⊂ C(N, v) [? ]. This implies that |C(N,wS)|< |C(N,w)|, meaning that
|C(N,wS)|< s. Thus, based on our assumption that Equation (48) holds, we find
that:
∀i ∈ N, δNwS (i) = λ
N
wS(i). (50)
Now, denote by Ĉ the set formed by the intersection of all coalitions in C(N,w),
i.e.,
Ĉ =
⋂
C∈C(N,w)
C. (51)
We will prove the correctness of Equation (49) in two steps, based on Ĉ. Specifi-
cally, in Step 2.1 we will prove that the equation holds for every i ∈ N \ Ĉ, while
in Step 2.2 we will prove that it holds for every i ∈ Ĉ.
Step 2.1. For every i ∈ N \ Ĉ, there exists a coalition in C(N,w) that does not
contain i. Let S be one such coalition. Then, for every C ⊆ N , we have:
MCCi (N,wS) = wS(C ∪ {i}) − wS(C) (based on Definition 8)
= w(C ∪ {i})− w((C ∪ {i}) ∩ S)− w(C) + w(C ∩ S) (based on Definition 13)
= w(C ∪ {i})− w(C ∩ S)− w(C) + w(C ∩ S) (because i /∈ S)
= w(C ∪ {i})− w(C)
= MCCi (N,w) (based on Definition 8)
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Consequently, the following two equations hold, as both δ and λ satisfy Prop-
erty P13:
∀i ∈ N \ Ĉ, δNwS (i) = δ
N
w (i), (52)
∀i ∈ N \ Ĉ, λNwS(i) = λ
N
w (i). (53)
Equations (50), (52) and (53) imply that Equation (49) holds for every i ∈ N \Ĉ,
which is what we wanted to prove in Step 2.1.
Step 2.2. In this step, we want to prove that Equation (49) holds for every
i ∈ Ĉ. In the case where Ĉ = ∅, the conclusion follows vacuously. Next, we will
deal with the case where |Ĉ|= 1, and then deal with the case where |Ĉ|> 1. In
both cases, we will make use of the fact that the following holds, as both δ and λ
satisfy Property P12: ∑
i∈N
δNw (i) =
∑
i∈N
λNw (i). (54)
First, assume that |Ĉ|= 1, and let b denote the only player in Ĉ. Since we know
that Equation (49) holds for every i ∈ N \ {b}, then Equation (54) implies that
δNw (b) = λ
N
w (b), i.e., it implies that Equation (49) holds for the one player in Ĉ,
which is what we wanted to show.
Now, assume that |Ĉ|> 1. Definition 12 and Equation (51) imply that every
coalition C that does not contain Ĉ satisfies: w(C) = 0. This implies that, for
every pair of players, i, j ∈ Ĉ, and every C ⊆ N \ {i, j}, we have: w(C ∪ {i}) =
w(C∪{j}) = 0. Therefore, every pair of players in Ĉ are symmetric in the game
(N,w). Consequently, the following holds, as both δ and λ satisfy Property P11:
δNw (i) = δ
N
w (j), ∀i, j ∈ Ĉ, (55)
λNw (i) = λ
N
w (j), ∀i, j ∈ Ĉ. (56)
Recall that we proved in Step 2.1 that Equation (49) holds for every i ∈ N \ Ĉ.
Based on this, equations (54), (55) and (56) imply that Equation (49) also holds
for every i ∈ Ĉ, which is what we wanted to prove. This concludes Step 2.2, and
so concludes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
Having proposed λ ∈ Θ as a measure of the average impact of a player in
a game (N, v) ∈ G , let us now move back to the main focus of this paper—
measuring the synergy in a coalition C ⊆ N . As mentioned earlier, we interpret
synergy as a deviation from the “norm”, which is considered in this section to be
the case where every member makes its average impact. With this interpretation,
every measure of average impact, θ ∈ Θ, leads to a different measure of synergy,
which is: v(C) −
∑
i∈C θ
N
v (i). Now if we adopt λ as our measure of choice
for the average impact, we arrive at the following measure of synergy: v(C) −∑
i∈C λ
N
v (i), which is the same as χ—the measure we arrived at in Section 3.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a new measure of synergy in teams and formally
analysed its properties.
18
